Seminar by Ozan Candoğan

Seminar by
Ozan Candoğan
Duke University

We study the multiperiod pricing problem of a service firm with capacity levels that vary over time. Customers are heterogeneous in their arrival and departure periods as well as valuations, and are fully strategic with respect to their purchasing decisions. The firm’s problem is to set a sequence of prices that maximizes its revenue while guaranteeing service to all paying customers. We provide a dynamic programming based algorithm that computes the optimal sequence of prices for this problem in polynomial time. We show that due to the presence of strategic customers, available service capacity at a time period may bind the price offered at another time period. This phenomenon leads the firm to utilize the same price in multiple periods, in effect limiting the number of different prices that the service firm utilizes in optimal price policies. Also, when customers become more strategic (patient for service), the firm offers higher prices. This may lead to the underutilization of capacity, lower revenues, and reduced customer welfare. We observe that the firm can combat this problem ability, beyond posted prices, to direct customers to different service periods.
This is a joint work with Christian Borgs (Microsoft), Jennifer Chayes (Microsoft), Ilan Lobel (NYU), and Hamid Nazerzadeh (USC).

Bio: Ozan Candogan is an assistant professor at the Fuqua School of Business, where he is a member of the Decision Sciences area. Prior to joining Fuqua, he received his Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His research interests are in mechanism design, decision making in social and economic networks, and analysis of dynamic strategic interactions. He is a recipient of the 2012 Microsoft Research Ph.D. fellowship, and 2009 Siebel Scholarship.