Strategic Behavior in Transportation Systems
In this talk we present the behavior of strategic customers in transportation systems. We consider two different models. In the first model, arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. Solving the game among customers, we determine their strategic behavior and explore the effect of key service parameters on cus- tomer behavior. In the second model, arriving customers decide whether to join the station or balk and the administrator sets the fee. In this case, a two-stage game among the customers and the administrator takes place. Moreover, we consider three cases distinguished by the level of delay information provided to customers at their arrival instants. We explore how system parameters affect the customer behavior and the fee imposed by the administrator. We then compare the three cases and show that the customers almost always prefer to know their exact waiting times whereas the administrator prefers to provide either no information or the exact waiting time depending on the system parameters.
Bio: Dr. Athanasia Manou is currently a postdoctoral research fellow at department of Industrial Engineering, Koç University, Turkey. She received the B.Sc. degree in Mathematics (2006), the M.Sc. degree in Operations Research (2009) and Ph.D. degree in Operations Research (December, 2014) all of them from National and Kapodistrian University, Athens, Greece. Her research interests lie in the areas of Operations Research and Stochastic Processes. In particular, her main interests concern optimization and game theoretic aspects of stochastic systems with applications mainly in queueing systems. In 2014, she received the AXA Postdoctoral Research Fellowship award for a two-year project with topic ‘Strategic Customers in Public-Private Service Systems Subject to Uncertainty and Congestion: Equilibrium Analysis’.